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JUVENILES, FIREARMS AND CRIME: EXTENDING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO PARENTS IN
OKLAHOMA AND BEYOND
I. INTRODUCTION
Children1 in America have a dubious reputation for causing violence and
going unpunished.2 The common perception that a violent juvenile will not be
punished for his/her crimes contributes to a heightened sense of unfairness among
adult Americans. This sense of unfairness, when compounded with hauntingly
vivid images and descriptions such as the massacre at Columbine High School4 in
Littleton, Colorado, forces communities to assert blame, which in turn may tear a
community apart.5  Another school shooting which occurred in Paducah,
Kentucky on December 1, 1997 inspired a lawsuit claiming, among other things,
1. Child, minor or juvenile, as used in this comment, shall include any male or female persons who
has not attained his eighteenth (18th) birthday. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA"), 18
U.S.C.A. § 5031 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 857 (West 1999).
2. See Steve Jacob, Myths and Realities of Juveniles and the Law, THE FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Sept. 3, 1999, available at 1999 WL 23947522 (addressing common perceptions that a
minor's criminal record disappears after age eighteen (18) and that minors are not punished for their
crimes).
3. See id.
4. See In The Line Of Fire, NEwsWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, available at 1999 WL 19354836 (reporting
the story of Columbine High School, Littleton Colorado, Apr.4,1999, where Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan
Klebold, 17, killed 13 and injured 23 using a TEC-DC9 handgun, a sawed-off shotgun, a pump-action
shotgun, and a 9mm rifle). Several unexploded bombs were later found by investigators. Id.
5. See Daniel Pederson, Lessons from Paducahv Slain Teens Families Quest for Vindication Divides
Community, NEWSWEEK, May 20,1999, available at 1999 WL 9500126.
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that the school was to blame for failing to detect the warning signs of violence.6
Other juvenile shootings7 in the past several years received heavy publicity
throughout America and shaped adult perceptions that juveniles are the "root of
all evil." 8 However, in reality, violent crimes committed by juveniles account for
only a minimal amount of the total number of violent crimes committed.9
Latest statistics compiled by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention indicated that in 1997, juveniles committed seventeen percent (17%)
of all violent crime 0 in America. x Of violent crime, juveniles accounted for
fourteen percent (14%) of all murders12 and seventeen percent (17%) of all
weapons violations. 3 Statistics also indicate that between 1987 and 1993, juvenile
homicide involving the use of a firearm increased one hundred and eighty-two
percent (182%). 14 Coupling these statistics with a fear that juveniles will go
unpunished for their use of firearms manifests an issue for both Oklahoma and the
United States of how to punish and prevent juvenile violence. As a solution to
this issue some people are calling for the imposition of criminal liability upon
parents for the criminal delinquency of their minor children.'5 This comment
takes the position that states should not use contributing to the delinquency of a
minor statutes to punish parents for the crimes of a child involving firearms.
However, parents should be punished, via access to firearms statutes, for allowing
their children unsupervised access to firearms.
This comment focuses on criminal penalties to parents based on the
delinquent acts of their children involving firearms. Part II-A describes the
history of parental liability in torts and then draws a distinction between civil and
criminal law. Part II-B discusses two types of parental liability statutes: 1)
6. Id.
7. Id. The author reports the event in Conyers, Ga., May 20, 1999, where T.J. Soloman is charged
with injuring six students; in Jonesboro, Ark., Mar. 24, 1998, where Mitchell Johnson and Andrew
Golden allegedly killed four students and one teacher and wounded ten others; in Pearl, Miss., Oct.1,
1997, where Luke Woodham killed his mother, two students and wounded seven others; and in
Springfield, Or., May 21,1998, where Kipland Kinkel allegedly killed two students and shot twenty-two
others. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Howard Snyder, Juvenile Proportion of Arrests by Offense, 1997, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, 1998, OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, (visited August 8, 1999),
http:llojjdp.ncjrs.orglojstatbblqaOO3.html.
10. Id. Violent crime includes criminal homicide (murder and non-negligent manslaughter), forcible
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id.
11. Id. Diagram of 1997 Violent Crime Index.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Howard Snyder, Known Juvenile Homicide Offenders by Weapon Type 1980-1995, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1997, OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book (visited August 8,
1999), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/qa05O.html.
15. See Child Firearms Access Prevention Act of 1998, S. 1917, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A)-(B); see
e.g., Rachel Smolkin Scripps, Parental Responsibility Laws, Plans Vary, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
May 2, 1999, at A10; Laura Sessions Stepp & Edward Walsh, Sins Of The Sons: Laws Aim At Parents,
THE WASHINGTON POST, April 27,1999, at C01; Kim Murphy & Melissa Healy, When The Sins Of The
Child Point To Parents, Law's Grip Is Tenuous Courts: Murderous Youths From Seattle To Littleton
Test Limits Of Growing Sanctions Aimed At Their Guardians, Los ANGELES TIMES, April 30,1999, at
Al.
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Contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes and 2) Access to firearms
statutes. This section also discusses the laws of California and Florida and then
presents an overview of Oklahoma's criminal parental liability law. Part III-A
discusses the application of the statutes in the model states and in Oklahoma. Part
III-B describes the constitutional challenges created by statutory applications.
Finally, Part IV concludes that criminal parental liability statutes in Oklahoma are
redundant to civil liability statutes and will fail to achieve the desired result of
reducing juvenile crime involving firearms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of Parental Liability: A Brief History of Parental Liability
Historically, parents were not criminally prosecuted for the crimes of their
children because parents were subject to the courts via tort law.16 Today, state
statutes impose vicarious 17 civil liability upon parents whose children cause injury
to third parties. 8 Even where civil liability is allowed by statute the recovery is
typically limited to either hundreds of dollars or several thousand dollars.19 In the
absence of a vicarious liability statute a parent may be held liable for the acts of
his/her child if the parent "directed it[,] ... encouraged it... or... ratified it by
accepting its benefits." 20 Similarly, a parent may incur civil liability if the parent
was "negligent in entrusting to a child a dangerous instrument such as a gun," or if
the parent left a gun "accessible to the child where misuse is a risk., 21 Of course,
the injured party must prove that the parent was aware of the risk as well as the
child's disposition towards violence."
The rationale behind parental liability is that parents are in the best position
to compensate an innocent third party for the willful and malicious acts of the
child because parents are more likely to have the money to make restitution.2 A
parent is in the best position to prevent their minor child from inflicting
intentional harm because the parent is around the child everyday and the parent is
the absolute mentor and teacher for the child throughout the child's life. 24 Tort
law allowed the extension of civil liability upon the parents in the belief that a
parent stood in a position of a special relationship with the child to exercise a
greater amount of control so as to reduce the amount of injuries to third parties.25
This special relationship is also codified in Section 316 of the Restatement
16. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 123, at 913 n.20 (5th
ed. 1984).
17. See BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990).
18. See KEETON, supra note 16, at 913.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 914.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Vanthournout v. Burge, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343 (I1n. App. Ct. 1979).
24. See id.
25. See KEETON, supra note 16, at 914.
2000]
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(Second) of Torts.26
Supporters of civil parental liability believe that parents will deter their
children from committing violence as long as the parents may be forced to pay for
the injuries resulting from the child's violent act(s),27 To the extent that parents
can be liable for the torts of their children, parental liability is not a new concept.
However, the transition from civil to criminal liability is a large step and
represents significant changes in how parents are viewed. Instead of the parent
being associated with a criminal, the parent becomes the criminal, which carries
much more stigma in our society than mere association with criminals.
B. To Be A Criminal
Criminal law involves higher stakes than civil law, a concept that should not
be taken lightly.28 For example, a person convicted of a crime may lose his or her
freedom in society and face severe monetary penalties. Yet, to be labeled a
criminal is more than paying fines and serving time in a jail cell. Professor George
K. Gardner provides a good illustration of why the label of a criminal conviction is
so feared by the public, stating:
The essence of punishment for moral delinquency lies in the criminal conviction
itself. One may lose more money on the stock market than in the court room; a
prisoner of war camp may well provide a harsher environment than a state prison;
death on the field of battle has the same physical characteristics as death by
sentence of law. It is the expression of the community's hatred, fear, or contempt
for the convict which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.
29
Criminal law generally requires strict constitutional and statutory safeguards
because of the potential for a citizen to be stripped of precious freedoms. 3 First,
the accused party is presumed innocent until proven guilty.31  Second, the
prosecution must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a heavy
burden for the State.32  Third, the doctrines of actus reus,33 mens rea3 and
26. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965), which reads in part:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to
prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Id.
27. KEETON, supra note 16, at 914.
28. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). The Supreme Court arguing that a reasonable
doubt standard should be used in criminal prosecutions and stating, "The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction." Id at 364.
29. George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33
B.U.L.REv. 176,193 (1953); quoted in Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw AND
CONTEMP. PROBs. 401 (1953).
30. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-.03.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
[Vol. 36:435
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causation 35 limit punishment of who should be convicted of a crime.36 Finally,
constitutional protections limit society's ability to punish.37
Conventional criminal statutes punish those who commit specific types of
conduct, which are deemed by society to be criminal in nature. However, criminal
parental liability statutes differ from conventional criminal statutes in that
criminal parental statutes punish a third party for the acts of another. Inspection
of criminal parental liability statutes yields two types of statutes. Both focus on
the parent and the parent's duty to supervise their child's access to firearms.
C. Model Statutes
1. Contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes.
The two general types of criminal parental liability statutes discussed in this
comment are: 1) Contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes and 2)
Negligent or reckless access to firearms statutes. These two general forms of
statutes stand as the last legislative line of defense in the battle against a minor's
use of firearms.36 They must be examined in order to understand each type as it
relates to parental duties to control a child's use of a firearm. Section 272 of
California's Penal Code will serve as the model primarily because it was the first
statute to employ strong language, but also because it was the first state code to
have an appellate decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute.
39
The California legislature custom tailored its contribution to the delinquency
of a minor statute to address the growing issue of juvenile violence and to reduce
gang-related activity.40 The statute is actually an old one that was enacted in 1903
41in the form of punishment for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
However, amid rampant juvenile gang-related violence, the statute was raised
from the dead in a political resurrection in 1988 that took the form of a powerful
amendment to the California Penal Code.42 The 1988 amendment to Section 272
of the California Penal Code included a sentence that placed parents in an
awkward position.43 After the amendment the statute reads in part, "a parent or
legal guardian to any person under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to
exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor
child." 44  A parent in California who does not exercise reasonable care,
supervision, protection and control over their child:
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-.03.
37. See generally U.S. CONST. art. V; id. amend. XIV.
38. See id.
39. See generally Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999).
41. CAL. STAT. ANN. PENAL CODE § 272 (Amended Sept. 26, 1988).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
2000]
5
AuBuchon: Juveniles, Firearms and Crime: Extending Criminal Liability to Pa
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars, ($2,500), or by imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment in
a county jail, or may be released on probation for a period not exceeding five
45years.
Now compare the first form of criminal parental liability to the second form,
negligent or reckless access to weapons statutes.
2. Access to Firearms Statutes
Due to the existence of parents' general duty to exercise reasonable control
over their child or children it was foreseeable that more specific duties would arise
in relation to a child's access to firearms. This is seen in a Florida statute which
requires a parent to exercise greater caution for access to firearms. 46 Section
784.05 of Florida Statutes Annotated should be viewed as the model for access to
firearms statutes because of its breadth and because of the specific exceptions
which indirectly place a duty upon parents or those whom the child knows well
enough to know where a firearm would be located in a residence. The Florida
statute makes access to a weapon by a minor culpable negligence. 47 Section 784.05
states:
(1) Whoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another person to personal
injury commits a misdemeanor of the second degree...
(2) Whoever, through culpable negligence, inflicts actual personal injury on
another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree...
(3) Whoever violates subsection (1) by storing or leaving a loaded firearm within
the reach or easy access of a minor commits, if the minor obtains the firearm and
uses it to inflict injury or death upon himself or herself or any other person, a felony
of the third degree...
However, this subsection does not apply:
(a) If the firearm was stored or left in a securely locked box or container or in a
location which a reasonable person would have believed to be secure, or was
securely locked with a trigger lock;
(b) If the minor obtains the firearm as a result of an unlawful entry by any person;
(c) To injuries resulting from target or sport shooting accidents or hunting
accidents; or
(d) To members of the Armed Forces, National Guard, or State Militia, or to police
or other law enforcement officers, with respect to firearm possession by a minor
which occurs during or incidental to the performance of their official duties....
(4) As used in this act, the term "minor" means any person under the age of 16.
Although the Florida statute does not explicitly mention application to
parents it is implicit within the language because it seeks to hold the provider of
45. Id.
46. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05 (West 1999).
47. See id.
48. Id.
[Vol. 36:435
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the weapon guilty of a misdemeanor through negligence by access alone.49 Also,
an exception to liability is that the statute does not apply when the firearm is
stolen. It can be deduced that a firearm cannot be stolen from the child's own
home, therefore, suggesting that this statute relates more toward the parent
because of the ease of access language. 0 Recent efforts to follow Florida's model
are also working their way through Congress.5
Public support for increasing parental responsibility is appearing at the
national level in Congress. 2 Regardless of whether the incentive of the legislators
to support parental criminal liability is a sincere effort to curb violence or whether
it is simply a token showing of political grand-standing and party-politics, the
substance of the legislation is not reduced. 53 Senate Bill 1917 is designed to
"prevent children from injuring themselves and others with firearms. 54 In light of
the recent perceived increase of teen violence committed in public places as
highlighted by the national media,55 congressional efforts to reduce the ease of
access to firearms may punish parents for allowing easy access to weapons by their
minor children.56 And the penalties could be the stiffest to date imposed on a
parent for the commission of a crime by his/her child with a maximum fine of
$10,000 and up to one (1) year of imprisonment if found guilty.5 7 Congress has not
only followed Florida's model, but has expanded it in an attempt to create a new
national model where parents are viewed as enemies of the state if they allow their
children access to weapons and those weapons are used to injure a third party58
49. See id.
50. See generally id.
51. See Child Firearms Access Prevention Act of 1998, S. 1917, 105th Cong. § 2(a). That Act reads
in pertinent part:
(2)Prohibition-Except as provided in paragraph (3) any person that -
(A) keeps a loaded firearm, or an unloaded firearm and ammunition for the firearm, any of
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise
substantially affects interstate or foreign commerce, within any premise that is under the
custody or control of that person; and
(B) knows, or reasonably should know, that a juvenile is capable of gaining access to the
firearm without the permission of the parent or legal guardian of the juvenile; shall, if a
juvenile obtains access to the firearm and thereby causes death or bodily injury to the
juvenile or to any other person, or exhibits the firearm either in a public place, or in
violation of subsection (q), be imprisoned not more than 1 year, fined not more that $10,000,
or both.
Id.
52. See Rachel Smolkin Scripps, Parental Responsibility Laws, Plans Vary, THE GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, May 2,1999, at A10.
53. See Kathleen Reagan, Blaming Parents is Taking the Easy Way Out, THE PATRIOT LEDGER,
May 29, 1999, at 19.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 4.
56. See Child Firearms Access Prevention Act of 1998, S. 1917,105th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A)-(B).
57. Id. at § 2(a)(2)(B).
58. See ic; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05 (West 1999). Language concerning negligence per se based
on lack of firearm locks is almost identical in both Florida statute and U.S. Senate legislation.
2000]
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The previously examined California and Florida models are also present in
Oklahoma's criminal statutes.59 Section 1273 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes
imposes a duty upon parents to restrain their child from committing acts of
violence with weapons by limiting access to firearms. 60 Moreover, Section 1273
provides that any parent who allows a child access or possession of a weapon,
other than a shotgun or rifle for the sake of sport, commits a crime punishable by
a fine of $100 or three months in jail.61 Additionally, any child who violates any
provision of Section 1273 is subject to "adjudication as a delinquent." 62
A delinquent in Oklahoma is defined in Section 857 of Title 21 as "a
minor... who shall have been or is violating any penal statute of this state." 6 If a
child becomes a delinquent under Section 857, it may in turn bring the parent
under the purview of another criminal statute, Title 21, Section 858.1. This section
is designed to protect minors from persons who would lead a minor astray.' In
addition, a child who brings a gun to school opens a parent up to an administrative
penalty of up to $200 or up to forty (40) hours of community service 65
Title 21, Section 858.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes targets parents directly,
similar to California Penal Code Section 272.66 The language of Section 858.1 also
follows closely the model of Section 272 of California's Penal Code, stating:
59. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05, with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1273 (West 1999). The
Oklahoma statute states:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person within this state to sell or give to any child any of the
arms or weapons designated in Section 1272 of this title; provided, the provisions of this
section shall not prohibit a parent from giving his or her child a rifle or shotgun for
participation in hunting animals or fowl, hunter safety classes, target shooting, skeet, trap or
other recognized sporting events, except as provided in subsection B of this section.
B. It shall be unlawful for any parent or guardian to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
permit his or her child to possess any of the arms or weapons designated in Section 1272 of
this title, including any rifle or shotgun, if such parent is aware of the substantial risk that the
child will use the weapon to commit a criminal offense or if the child has either been
adjudicated a delinquent or has been convicted as an adult for any criminal offense.
C. Omitted
D. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished as
provided in Section 1276 of this title, and, any child violating the provisions of this section
shall be subject to adjudication as a delinquent. In addition, any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be liable for civil damages for any injury or death to any
person and for any damage to property resulting from any discharge of a firearm or use of
any other weapon. Any person convicted of violating the provisions of this section after
having been issued a concealed handgun license pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma
Self-Defense Act, Sections 1 issued a through 25 of this act, may be liable for an
administrative violation as provided in Section 1276 of this title.
E.As used in this section, "child" means a person under eighteen (18) years of age.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 857 (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 1273.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 857(4).
64. See generally Lewis v. State, 212 P.2d 148 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949); Wallin v. State, 182 P.2d 788
(Okla. Crim. App. 1947). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (contributing to the delinquency of
a minor statute).
65. See id. § 858.
66. Compare id. § 856, with CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999).
[Vol. 36:435
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(A) Any parent or other person who knowingly and willfully: (1) causes, aids, abets
or encourages any minor to be in need of supervision, or deprived; or (2) shall by
any act or omission to act have caused, encouraged or contributed to the
deprivation, or the need of supervision of the minor, or to such minor becoming
deprived, or in need of supervision; shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined a sum not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars
($500.00), or imprisonment in the county jail for a period not to exceed one (1) year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment. (B) Upon a second or succeeding
conviction for a violation of this section, the defendant shall be fined not more than
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or imprisoned in the county jail not to exceed
one (1) year, or punished by both such fine and imprisonment.
6 7
Oklahoma's statutes appear to be a jumbled ball of string that may lead to an
end but will take a long time to unravel. It is unclear how the application of the
laws will withstand the scrutiny of appellate review when a child uses a firearm to
commit an assault or murder. Unlike California, Oklahoma does not have a
published decision on point. Also, it would seem there is some conflict between
Oklahoma's civil and criminal statutes concerning liability of the parent for the
child's delinquent act(s).6 On one hand, Title 21, Section 1273 establishes
negligence per se and states that a parent is liable for any civil damages that result
from a child's illegal use of a firearm.69
On the other hand, Title 10, Section 20 clearly states that a parent is not
liable for acts of his/her child.70  Title 10, Section 20, as interpreted by the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals, applies only to limit the civil liability of parents with
exception to criminal and delinquent acts of the child.71 Therefore, according to
case law and statute, a parent is liable for any criminal act of the child, but the
parent is not liable for any simple torts committed by the child.72  If the child
67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856(1).
68. Compare id. § 1273, with id. tit. 10, § 20 ("Neither parent or child is answerable, as such, for the
act of the other.").
69. Id. tit. 21, § 856(D) (stating, "[A]ny person violating the provisions of this article shall be liable
for civil damages for any injury or death to any person and any damage to property resulting from any
discharge of a firearm or use of any other weapon."). Id
70. Id. tit 10, § 20.
71. Glidden v. Higgs, 839 P.2d 680, 680 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that where son had an
accident and was issued a traffic citation for failure to yield did not constitute a criminal or delinquent
act and parents were not liable for the non criminal traffic accident of their son). Glidden cites Title
10, Section 20 and Title 23, Section 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes for this holding. See OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 20 (stating neither parent or child is answerable for the acts of the other is limited to the
criminal or delinquent acts of the child); id. tit. 23, § 10 (stating that a parent is liable for criminal or
delinquent acts of his or her child).
72. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10. This section states:
The state or any county, city, town, municipal corporation or school district, or
any person, corporation or organization, shall be entitled to recover damages in a
court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any minor under the age of
eighteen (18) years, living with the parents at the time of the act, who shall
commit any criminal or delinquent act resulting in bodily injury to any person or
damage to or larceny of any property, real, personal or mixed, belonging to the
state or a county, city, town, or municipal corporation, school district, person,
corporation or organization. The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).
2000]
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commits a crime, then the parents are liable for restitution damages and or
incarceration; but if a child commits a simple tort, then the parents face no legal
liability.
7 3
By examining the above statutes, common threads become apparent: 1)
parents have a duty to reasonably control and care for their minor children so as
not to allow their children to become delinquent; 2) parents who own a firearm
are under a duty to exercise all reasonable precautions to prevent a minor's access
to a firearm; 3) parents who breach this duty are criminally negligent and subject
to sanctions by the State which may include a fine or a period of short
imprisonment; and 4) parents who breach their duty to reasonably limit a minor's
access to a firearm, when the minor uses the firearm to injure a third party, are
punishable by fines and imprisonment. A parent is also liable for civil damages
filed by the injured third party which result from the minor's use of the firearm to
inflict injury. In conclusion, a parent whose child commits a crime using a firearm,
which the parent knew about or reasonably should have known about the child
having access to, is open to imposition of criminal penalties.
III. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL
A. Illustrative Cases
The most influential authority regarding criminal prosecution of parents for
their children's crimes comes from California. In Williams v. Garcetti,74 the
California Supreme Court heard a case where the mother of a child who
participated in a gang rape was charged with violation of Section 272 of
California's Penal Code.75 Mrs. Williams allowed her son to participate in a gang
and was not only knowledgeable of the gang-related activity, but apparently
encouraged his activities.76 The mother was charged by the State of California for
contributing to the delinquency of her son based on the facts that circumstantial
evidence culminated in her knowledge of his gang-related activity.77
The court reasoned that her conduct resulted in criminal negligence based
upon the statute, which recognizes a duty by the parent to exercise reasonable
control78 over his/her children.79 In finding criminal negligence the court required
a higher standard than that required under tort law.'° And in applying the higher
standard the California Supreme Court used the objective test to determine the
criminal state of mind or the mens rea8' by stating, "[I]f a reasonable person in
73. See id. tit. 10, § 20.
74. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of Criminal
Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 859, 859 (March 1991).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999).
79. Williams, 853 P.2d at 514.
80. Id.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (defining negligent state of mind).
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defendant's position would have been aware of the risk involved, then defendant
is presumed to have had such an awareness."' '
Williams strengthened the theory and practice of prosecuting parents
because it gave persuasive authority for every other state to draw from when they
take these types of statutes to task in the courts. Although it strengthened the
enforcement of the statute the decision helped to clear the water of a muddy
subject. Williams limited the scope of parental liability by requiring knowledge by
the parent of the delinquency, stating, "The amendment requires parents who
know of or reasonably should know of the child's risk of delinquency to exercise
their duty of supervision and control." 83 This language is very similar to the
established law of parental liability in torts, which is codified in Section 316 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section states that the parent is liable for the
acts of his/her child when the parent is aware of the risk.84 The court analogized
the rationale behind criminal penalization as of the same type of duties required
of the parent in the law of torts and, in the mind of the court, criminal prosecution
placed no extension of duty beyond what was already required of parentsY5 Also,
the California Supreme Court allowed the defendant to claim a defense whereby a
parent is not liable if he or she exercises reasonable efforts in supervision and
control.86
However, the ever-nebulous issue of what reasonable supervision is should
give courts some pause. The California Supreme Court addressed the issue,
stating, "There is no formula for determination of reasonableness. Yet standards
of this kind are not impermissibly vague, provided their meaning can be
objectively ascertained by reference to common experiences of mankind." 87 It is
not clear from the court's language what constitutes reasonableness, but it
arguably does not mean a parent giving a child a semi-automatic firearm or
allowing the child to participate in a gang.88
California is not the only state to impose criminal parental liability for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Numerous states89 have codified
82. Williams, 853 P.2d at 514.
83. Id.
84. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at § 316.
85. See Williams, 853 P.2d at 514.
86. Id.
87. Williams, 853 P.2d at 513 (citing People v. Daniels 459 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1969)).
88. For discussion of void for vagueness argument, see infra Part III (5).
89. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (West 1999); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.130 (West 1999); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5-27-205, 5-27-220 (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1999); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-701 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (West 1999); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 11, § 1102 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-1 (West 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 709-904
(1999); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 23, para. 2361A (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-8 (West 1999); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 233.1 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608 (1999); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530. 060
(Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 554 (West
1999); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-831 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 63
(West 1999); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.315 (West
1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-39 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-709 (West 1999); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 201.110 (Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-13:41 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:24-4 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-3 (Michie 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney
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statutes, which penalizes parents who either neglect their duty to exercise
reasonable care in supervising their child or who allow a minor access to
weapons.90 Oklahoma has traditionally used the contributing to the delinquency
of a minor statute, Title 21, Section 856 of the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, to
punish parents for allowing their child to become a truant91 or for a person who
sexually abuses or provides the minor with intoxicating substances.92 However, as
society evolves, the contributing to the delinquency of minor statutes may be
applied in new situations that will test the limits of the statute's usefulness.
Attention must now turn to a model case for access to firearms statutes.
Unfortunately, appellate review of access to firearm statutes is minimal to
nonexistent.
Tyson v. State93 is the only Florida appellate decision regarding the use of
Section 784.05(3) of the Florida statutes.94 In Tyson, the State of Florida charged
Tracy S. Tyson with culpable negligence for allowing her minor child access to a
loaded firearm, which the minor then used to injure another person.95 The Florida
Court of Appeals did not review the constitutionality of the statute on its face nor
did the court review the application of the statute as applied to the parent.96
Rather, the court simply found that the statute should be upheld and the parent
should be liable.97
Access to firearms statutes worked their way into our nation's criminal law
jurisprudence to add incentive to keep firearms out of the hands of minors. The
desire to provide negative incentives for adults to keep firearms out of the hands
of minors propelled the enactment of access to firearm statutes. The Tyson case
exemplifies a tragic situation in which a statutorily derived heightened parental
awareness to the dangers of easy access to firearms may have prevented the
injuries to the other party. The following case is a good, albeit distressing,
example of why our society needs access to firearms statutes to increase a parent's
awareness to the dangers of easy access to firearms.
Andrew Golden, age eleven (11) and Mitchell Johnson, age thirteen (13) had
easy access to firearms.98 On the morning of the day of the shooting, Mitchell
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-06 (1999); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2919.25 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.575
(1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4304 (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-4 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-17-490 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 26-9-1 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-156 (1999);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 72.002 (Vernon 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1999); VA. CODE.
ANN. § 18.2-371-(1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.42.030 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE § 49-7-7
(1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.40 (West 1999).
90. See generally Kathryn J. Parsley, Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold Parents
Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1991).
91. Habitually absent from school.
92 See generally Cox v. State, 270 P.2d 373 (Okla. 1954); Lewis v. State, 212 P.2d 148 (Okla. 1950);
Wallin v. State, 182 P.2d 788 (Okla. 1947).
93. Tyson v. State, 646 So.2d 816 (1994).
94. Id. at 816.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See David Brauer & John McCormick, The Boys Behind the Ambush, NEWSWEEK, April 6,
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drove the Johnson's van to the Golden's home to pick up Andrew.99 At the
Golden's home, the boys tried unsuccessfully to break into a safe to get to some
high-powered weapons.' °°
However, the boys were unable to open the safe, but did take several
handguns from elsewhere in the house.01 The boys then drove to Andrew's
grandparents' farm, broke into the basement, and procured three high-powered
rifles and four handguns.'02 With their assembled arsenal the boys drove the van
to an ambush spot, dressed in camouflage and laid in wait until students emptied
the school into the shooting field in response to a fire alarm. 03 Together, the boys
shot a total of fifteen (15) people within one minute. Of the fifteen (15) people
who were shot, five (5) were mortally wounded.' °4 Although deeply disturbing,
the scenario of Jonesboro, Arkansas is not a recent development for our nation.
Consider another tragedy, which happened in 1965. The horror unfolded
when Michael Clark, sixteen (16), who was a Boy Scout, Sea Scout and member of
his high school band and who did not use drugs, alcohol or display any
psychological instability, took to the streets. 05 On April 24, 1965, he started the
atrocity by leaving his parents' Long Beach home around 8 p.m. in his parents'
car, outfitted with his parents' credit cards and his father's 6.5 millimeter Swedish
Mauser with telescopic site.'06
Around 6 a.m. the following morning, Michael positioned himself
overlooking a busy highway and proceeded to fire the Mauser at passing
automobiles.' °7 Three people were killed and several others were wounded before
Michael ultimately shot himself.108 Michael appeared to be a normal young man
before his rampage and his parents did not know that he was a violent person.0 9
However, if an access to firearm statute was in force at that time, the ease of
access to the rifle would make the parents more likely to be criminally liable for
the harm that Michael caused.
Michael's father seemed to have done everything that a reasonable person
would do to raise a healthy child."0 Yet, Forest Clark, Michael's father should
have gone beyond reasonable rearing of Michael and taken the steps necessary to
keep a weapon out of a minor's unsupervised hands. Unfortunately, Mr. Clark,
kept the rifle in a locked gun cabinet-closet along with a sack of steel jacketed
ammunition, which, as it turned out, Michael could unlock without anyone
1998, at 20.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Brauer & McCormick, supra note 98, at 20.
104. Id.
105. See Reida v. Lund, 96 Cal.Rptr. 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
106. Id at 103.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
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noticing.' Certainly, the situations involving Michael Clark and Jonesboro are
what legislatures have in mind when they adopt criminal access to firearms
statutes.
Popular opinion holds parents accountable for the ease of access a minor has
112to weapons. Certainly the children who committed the assault upon their
schools in Jonesboro, Arkansas or Paducah, Kentucky had a higher level of ease
of access and a lower level of supervision." Yet, ease of access alone should not
make parents liable for their child's acts. There should be the additional
component of provocation or instigation by the parent to use the weapon in an
offensive manner. Similarly, the parent should be held accountable for the failure
to properly educate and instruct the minor on the uses and dangers weapons
present. Where statutes exist, parents are being charged with liability for the acts
of their children in appropriate situations. Yet, a statute's mere existence does not
guarantee that the statute is primae facie enforceable.
B. Constitutional Problems Presented By Application
1. Due Process
a. Over breadth Analysis
i. Contributing to the Delinquence of Minor Statutes
To be enforceable a statute must be constitutional and because the statute is
criminal in nature, it must survive the due process test. A statute will be
overturned for violating due process if it infringes upon constitutionally protected
conduct.1 4 Criminal statutes require a higher standard of certainty to determine
that the statute does not infringe upon constitutionally protected rights."5 A
statute may also be invalid on its face even if there are situations of valid
application." 6 When evaluating the constitutionality of a criminal parental
liability statute, on the basis of contributing to the delinquency of minor by
allowing the knowing, negligent or reckless access to a firearm, the courts should
apply the strict scrutiny test." 7
Strict scrutiny is applied when a court determines that a statute infringes
upon a constitutionally protected freedom." 8 The Fourteenth Amendment gives a
"wide scope of discretion" to the states to enact laws that "affect some groups of
111. See Lund, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 103.
112. See, e.g., Murphy & Healy, supra note 15.
113. See Brauer & McCormick, supra note 98.
114. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
115. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
116. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401 (1979); see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939).
117. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 454 U.S. 374,388 (1978).
118. Id.
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citizens differently than others."11 9 A statute is presumed to be constitutional by a
reviewing court, but to overcome the presumption, when there is an over breadth
claim, requires a court to find that there exists a member of a particular class of
people requiring special protection.120 Parents become members of a protected
class when they are targeted as a separate class distinct from other people in the
community.1
Next, a court must find that the party possesses a fundamental right that is
protected by the Constitution.'2 A court should determine that the implicated
fundamental right is the right to raise a child without governmental interference.' 3
Once a court determines that the statute infringes upon a fundamental right the
court then should apply the test of strict scrutiny.124 A statute will not survive the
strict scrutiny test unless "it is supported by sufficiently important state interests
and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.' ' lu
Contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes should invoke the strict
scrutiny test. Yet, the state interests in the enforcement of contributing to the
delinquency of minor statutes and access to firearms statutes are traditionally
different. Contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes are designed to
keep minors away from "evil and people who would lead the minor astray."
126
Whereas access to firearms statutes are designed to reduce the number of deaths
from accidental discharge of a loaded weapon, which might result from carelessly
leaving a loaded weapon in the presence of a child. 27
However, the purposes of these statutes have undoubtedly changed in lieu of
catastrophic crimes involving minors and their use of firearms to commit
premeditated and brutal murders.8 It can be inferred by reviewing both types of
statutes that they are likely to be similarly applied for the attainment of a common
goal. That goal is to force parents to exercise greater control over their children,
specifically to keep them away from weapons and firearms.
Therefore, the compelling state interest would be to increase a parent's
responsibility to control his/her children and to reduce a child's access to firearms.
It is hard to argue that the reduction of access to firearms, other than for the sake
119. McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961).
120. See Zablocki, 454 U.S. at 388.
121. See generally id.
122. Id.
123. See generally Sharon A. Ligorsky, Note And Comment Williams v. Garcetti: Constitutional
Defects in California's "Gang-Parent" Liability Statute, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 447 (1994) (giving an
excellent argument about why parental liability statutes should be tested under the strict scrutiny
standard of review).
124. See Zablock4 454 U.S. at 388.
125. Id.
126. Lewis v. State, 212 P.2d 148 (1950) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 856 (1903).
127. See generally State v. Greene, 348 So.2d 3 (1977).
128. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 856 (West 1999) (defining a street gang and making
the participation in a street gang a criminal offense if the person aided the minor to become a gang
member). Therefore, it may be inferred that the purpose of the law is directed more at the reduction
of gang violence instead of the traditional uses of the statute which enforced the law against parents for
truancy and giving a child intoxicating spirits. Id.
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of sport, is not a compelling state interest. It is paramount that the state reduces
the number of weapon violations, especially when minors commit seventeen
percent (17%) of all weapons violations. It is also important to the state to reduce
the number of delinquents in the juvenile court system. 129 However, even if a state
presents a compelling state interest, a court must determine that the statute is
tailored closely enough to effectuate only those interests to which the statute
pertains.13°
For a court to determine that the suspect statute is narrowly drafted to the
purpose for which it was intended the court must consider whether the statute is
the least burdensome or restrictive way of effectuating the purported purpose. 131
Therefore, Section 858 in title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated must be
the least burdensome means to force parents to exercise reasonable care over
their children, so as to reduce the amount of access that minors have to weapons.
By looking to other state statutes, there appear to be other less intrusive and less
burdensome means of regulating the parent's supervision of a child, rather than
punishing a parent by using the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute.
Specifically, the heavy reliance by the California Supreme Court on the
relationship that a parent has to the child in tort law should alone be enough to
constitute a less burdensome means of increasing control over a child, while
reducing the minor's access to weapons. The relationship that a parent has to
the child in tort law allows an injured party to sue the parent for crimes that a
child commits. 133 This alone should be enough to force parents to act responsibly
and reasonably when they leave weapons around the house.
Another author strongly argues that application of the strict scrutiny
standard to these types of statues is inappropriate when the state has less
burdensome options, such as using court mandated parenting classes or requiring
the parent to become a part of the rehabilitation of his/her child within the
juvenile court system.Y34 Therefore, there are less intrusive and less burdensome
means of increasing a parent's duty to supervise a child and to reduce the amount
of juvenile violence. Thus, the statute should not pass the muster of a strict
scrutiny test because there are less burdensome means of effecting the desired
result.
However, in the past, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest
criminal court in Oklahoma, did not apply the strict scrutiny standard when
interpreting Sections 856 and 858 of the Oklahoma Statutes.135 Rather, the court
129. See generally Snyder, supra note 9, Diagram of 1997 Violent Crime Index.
130. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 454 U.S. 374,388 (1978).
131. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,343 (1972).
132. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507,514 (Cal. 1993).
133. See. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 20.
134. See Ligorsky, supra note 121, at 461; see also Williams, 853 P.2d at 514 (arguing that the use of
settled tort law and court mandated parenting classes is a less intrusive means of increasing a parent's
duty to control their child).
135. See Cox v. State, 270 P.2d 373, 376 (Okla. 1954); Lewis v. State, 212 P.2d 148 (Okla. 1950);
Wallin v. State, 182 P.2d 788 (Okla. 1947).
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stated that the preventive and protective nature of the statutes require that they
be liberally construed so that the usefulness and strength of the statute is not
impaired.136 The court argued that the very purpose of the statute is to prevent
minors from engaging in criminal conduct and to protect the child from further
harm. The court reasoned that these goals would be impaired by giving the statute
a narrow, limited and strict construction.1 37
More likely, the court would determine that parents are not a protected class
of persons under the Constitution in relation to criminal statutes and would thus
decline to apply strict scrutiny.138 Even if the court determined that parents were a
protected class of people in criminal statutes, the court would apply the rational
relationship test to the statute and would likely not invalidate the statute on the
grounds that it is overbroad based on the court's past relevant decisions.139 On the
other hand, access to firearms statutes should not require strict scrutiny and would
survive the test of rational relationship to a compelling state interest.
ii. Access to Firearms Statutes
Access to firearms statutes are not overbroad in their application. In
response to overbroad application arguments courts should determine that
parents are not a protected class of people and that all people are treated equally
under the statute. Thus, a court should determine that the statute must survive
both the tests of rational relationship and compelling state interest. Access to
firearms statutes are very specific.1 4  They relate to conduct that could
conceivably allow a child to use a weapon to injure another person.
The state's interest is to protect a youth from accidental discharge of a
weapon and to prevent the public from intentional crimes by an unstable,
unsupervised child. Therefore, imposition of criminal liability upon a parent for
negligent or reckless access to a firearm bears a reasonable relation to the state's
goal of reducing injuries caused by children using firearms. Furthermore, there is
no foundation for the court to invoke the strict scrutiny test because there is no
fundamental constitutional right to give minor children weapons for uses other
than sport and hunting.141 The Constitution protects the freedom to keep and bear
arms, but it arguably does not mean that twelve-year-old Timmy should get a fully
automatic Uzi with high capacity clips during Christmas time for unsupervised
shooting. In short, the statute should survive an argument that it is over broad.
b. Vagueness Analysis
Criminal parental liability statutes may be attacked on grounds that they are
vague. A statute is void for vagueness when it fails to: 1) provide adequate notice
136. See Cox, 270 P.2d at 376; Lewis, 212 P.2d at 149.
137. Wallin, 182 P.2d at 788.
138. See generally Cox, 270 P.2d at 373; Lewis, 212 P.2d at 148; Wallin, 182 P.2d at 788.
139. See generally Cox, 270 P.2d at 373; Lewis, 212 P.2d at 148; Wallin, 182 P.2d at 788.
140. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1273 (West 1999).
141. See U.S. CONsT. art. II.
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to a person of normal intelligence that his conduct is forbidden by statute or 2)
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. 43 The Supreme Court, in
Kolender v. Lawson, recognized that the most important element of vagueness is
the "requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement... [W]here the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit a standard less sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."'144 Contributing to
the delinquency of a minor and access to firearms statutes should survive the void
for vagueness argument.
i. Contributing to the delinquency of minor statutes.
In Kolender, the Supreme Court overturned a statute, which defined
vagrancy as a crime and allowed police to question persons suspected to be
vagrants.1 45 If the person did not identify himself/herself and explain why he/she
was at the particular location the person would be taken to jail. 46 The statute
provided law enforcement officers with complete discretion to select against
whom they wanted to enforce the law. 47
This is unlike criminal parental liability statutes, which do not enable a law
enforcement officer to have "virtually complete discretion,1'4  because
contributing to the delinquency statutes incorporate the same types of
responsibilities as those found in tort law. 49 A prosecutor must also prove some
connection to the mens rea, mental intent or knowledge of the parent.150 Yet, the
contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes may give more leeway to the
prosecutor than the access to firearms statutes because the contributing to the
delinquency of minor statutes are considerably broader in language compared to
the more defined access to firearms statutes. 51
Although the United States Supreme Court placed a higher standard on
enforcement guidelines, it nonetheless created a standard for determining whether
the accused received adequate notice that his/her action was illegal. In
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the United States Supreme Court set forth a
test for, "fair warning," that would bar a statute as void for vagueness if:
1. [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application.
2. [T]he canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures
142. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
143. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574
(1974)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 515 (Cal. 1993).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1273 (West 1999), with id. § 856.
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fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to
conduct clearly covered.
3. [A court is barred from] applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to
conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to
be within its scope.
152
The Court further stated in United States v. Lanier, that "the touchstone is
whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably
clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. 153
Requiring a parent to know that his/her omission or commission of poor
parenting may bring him/her within the scope of criminal parental liability statutes
stretches the limits of what is deemed as notice. Yet, courts do not particularly
mind the extension because they reason that parents have a long-standing
recognized duty under tort law to supervise their children and that such duty is
basically the same as that of tort law in criminal parental liability statutes. 54
Section 272 of the California Penal Code states that parents have a duty to
"exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor
child." 155 Parents of normal intelligence would most likely be able to define what
reasonable control over their child means in relation to the duty to supervise. Yet,
the attack upon parental criminal liability statutes is premised upon the theory
that parents would not know what reasonable supervision means and therefore
would not have notice that their conduct was criminal.
However, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States,"6  "There is no formula for determination of
reasonableness. 157 Courts should look to the "reason of the law," and not merely
at the wording in order to avoid decisions which might lead to "injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence. '' 158 A reasonable parent would or should
know not to give his/her child a gun and tell him/her or allow the child to harm
someone. A reasonable parent would know that he/she should not leave weapons
around the house without adequate supervision by a responsible adult.
Constitutionally, criminal parental liability statutes seldom face review in
appellate courts. However, in Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the notice requirement of Section 272 of the California Penal Code by
stating, "[A] statutory definition of perfect parenting would be inflexible and not
necessary to identify the egregious breaches of parental duty that come with the
statute's purview.' 59 The court seems to assume that parents should know how to
teach their children to discern right from wrong. But the court reiterates that it
152. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).
153. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
154. See Williams, 853 P.2d at 514.
155. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999).
156. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
157. Id at 357.
158. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1968).
159. Williams, 853 P.2d at 514.
2000]
19
AuBuchon: Juveniles, Firearms and Crime: Extending Criminal Liability to Pa
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
will only punish those egregious situations where parents are clearly at fault. 160
Common sense dictates that a parent should know what constitutes reasonable
control over their child. To put limits on what reasonable control over a child
means would limit the effectiveness of these statutes and weaken a court in its
discretion to enforce the law in cases where the parent knew that their child was
becoming a delinquent.
ii. Access to firearms statutes.
Access to firearms statutes are very specific. The analysis for vagueness, as
applied to contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes, should also be
applied to access to firearms statutes. Thus, an access to firearms statute must: 1)
"[p]rovide adequate notice to a person of normal intelligence [to whom he or she
can] contemplate that his [or her] conduct is forbidden by statute"'161 and 2)
"[e]stablish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."' 62  It takes little
common sense to derive from the statute's wording that a parent should keep all
weapons away from their minor child unless the child is hunting or shooting for
sport.
163
Parents of normal intelligence would know from reading Title 21, Section
1273 of the Oklahoma Statutes that it is unlawful for the parent to give or allow
the possession of any firearm other than a shotgun or rifle for the sake of sport.
164
A reasonable parent would know, by reading the law, that a child should not have
a pistol. It follows, therefore, that the parent should not give their child a semi-
automatic assault rifle.
A reasonable parent would take measures to ensure that their child does not
have unauthorized access to the parent's weapons. Trigger locks, gun safes and
bolt locks are all relatively inexpensive means of reducing a child's access to a
firearm and is considered a defense under the Florida access to firearm statute.
165
Section 784.05 of the Florida statutes states, "this subsection does not apply.., if
the firearm was stored or left in a securely locked box or container or in a location
which a reasonable person would have believed secure, or was securely locked
with a trigger lock."' 66 Separating ammunition from weapons and keeping the
weapon unloaded are very simple means of reducing the ease of firearm access to
a minor. These relatively inexpensive reductions to access should also be
accompanied by education and awareness of the dangers presented by weapons
and their unauthorized use.
The second prong of the vagueness doctrine, as applied to access to firearms
statutes, is also satisfied. A law enforcement officer would not have complete
160. See generally id. The Court analyzes legislative intent issues regarding enactment of the statute.
Id
161. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,162 (1972).
162. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,358 (1983).
163. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1273 (West 1999).
164. See generally id.
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05 (West 1999).
166. Id.
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discretion to enforce the law with these statutes. 167 These statutes relate to specific
instances of conduct by the parent which result in specific instances of conduct by
the child.16s Thus, law enforcement is controlled by the specificity of the statutes
and if written correctly should withstand a void for vagueness argument.
Yet, when a child plans to do an evil deed with a gun the child may not
procure it from his/her home. As was the case with the teenagers who attacked
the Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. 169 However, these statutes are
directed more towards parents who leave their weapons and ammunition open to
170their children as was the case with the children in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Parents
should be estopped from denying that they did not know that their child was likely
to possess a gun. The consequences and losses are too great for a parent to
continue to ignore the dangers.
Contributing to the delinquency of a minor criminal parental liability
statutes, unfortunately, look backwards at conduct that perhaps happened years
before the criminal act. Efforts are made to find circumstances where the parent
should have been a better parent. This could lead to parental "witch-hunting" by
those members of the community who were injured physically or emotionally by
the delinquent child. This is the inherent problem of retrospective laws. Putting
parents on the stand for failing to keep a deadly weapon out of a child's hands
may not be nearly as hard to swallow as it would be to inquire into the deepest,
most basic areas of parenting, such as the lessons in distinguishing right from
wrong.
The problem with punishing parents is that the child has already committed
the crime. The fact that a parent is put on notice to keep his/her child under
reasonable control loses its muster when the child much of his/her criminal activity
outside the home away from parental guidance. Punishing parents for the crimes
of their minor child seems to defy the entire concept of causation in criminal law.
iii. Causation.
Causation is clear in situations where the child commits the crime. If the
accused child caused the harm to the third person then the child should be
punished for the injury. To punish the child would follow the retributive theory of
criminal law by punishing an actor for the crime that the actor committed.7
However, causation is only clear in relation to the third party and the child
because of the direct link between the child's voluntary action and the harm to the
third party. When a parent is tried for the acts of his/her child the burden of
proving causation should be difficult. The prosecutor must show a link between
167. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162.
168. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1273 (West 1999).
169. See Erika Check, Elizabeth Angell, Sherry Keene-Osborn & Donna Foote, The New Age of
Anxiety: Whether They Live in a Leafy Suburb or an Inner City, Parents can no Longer Pretend that
Their Children are Immune From the Threat of Guns. The Challenge is to Make Kids Feel Secure - But
Also Aware of the Real Risks, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at 39; See also Reagan, supra note 53.
170. See Brauer & McCormick, supra note 98, at 20.
171. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW Ch. 2 § C. 27 (1994).
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the "parent's behavior and the child's delinquency."' 72 It would not suffice to
prove that the parent was merely in the home when the child took steps toward
commission of a crime.173 Nor would it suffice to prove guilt when the parents did
not know that their child was at risk or that their child was a danger to others.174
In order to prove guilt the prosecutor must show a direct "causal link"
between the child's act and the act or acts of the parent. 75 The standard of proof
for the mens rea would be criminal negligence of the parent. 76 If a parent were to
contribute directly or encourage a child to commit a wrong, the parent would fall
more squarely under accomplice statutes than if the parent failed to exercise
control over his/her child.177 A parent's failure to act must be so egregious that a
reasonable person would know in the same or similar circumstances that such
omission would result in the injury of another person.178
However, the California Supreme Court in Williams argued that causation
was not an issue.179 The court in Williams found that the necessary elements of
causation are so well entrenched in civil cases that the court all but dismissed the
issue in and of itself, stating that proving causation "has not proved unduly
troublesome."' s Thus, the Williams court ignored the longstanding concepts of
criminal law in deference to the relationship that a parent has to a child in civil
law. A court must not ignore the duty to inspect all possible weaknesses in a
statute simply because the relationship exists within a separate body of law.
V. CONCLUSION
States should not use contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes to
punish parents for the crimes of a child involving firearms. To punish someone for
poor parenting is a weak attempt by legislatures to incorporate popular opinion
into law; thereby, demonstrating that the legislatures are getting tough on crime.
Unfortunately, this results in redundant lawmaking. The longstanding judicial
history of civil parental liability for criminal acts of a child should be enough to
hold parents accountable for the delinquent acts of their children. To attempt to
punish parents for the knowing or negligent supervision of the child is overbroad
and it could extend to every day decisions and supervision of the family unit. A
parent would not only fear that he/she might be civilly liable for the acts of his/her
child, but a parent should now fear that he/she will also go to jail or be fined.
Getting tough on criminals is desirable, but getting tough on parents is something
172 Id.
173. See Charlie Brennan, Parents Rarely Held Responsible Few in Colorado Face Charges in Kid's
Crimes, DENVER RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 30, 1999, at 4A (quoting former Denver chief
deputy district attorney Craig Silverman: "You'd have to prove that they knew that those homicides
were intended, and then they had to do something to help.").
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507,514 (Cal. 1993).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id.
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we should not consider.
Using contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes to punish parents
may not be vague because of the longstanding definition in tort law. But that is
exactly the problem since tort law is less intrusive and less burdensome to the state
to enforce against the negligent parent. Enforcing these statutes will cost the state
a great deal in prosecution and may gain very little in return. Also, parents may
not be the cause of the delinquency of the child. The child may simply be
mentally incapacitated or disrupted by peers.
This leads to the conclusion that parents should be punished for allowing
their children unsupervised access to firearms via access to firearms statutes. A
parent should know that the possession of a firearm in a household with children
poses a significant danger if the child is not supervised or educated about the
dangers of the weapon. An unstable child could quickly become destructive by
accessing weapons left unsecured. Prevention is easy and inexpensive and the
potential costs in human life are so great that the parent must take the effort to
keep children away from firearms other than for the use of sport or hunting to the
best of the parent's ability.
States should actively pursue the parents who allow their children to possess
and use a weapon to commit a crime or injury. However, states should not use the
contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes to increase the standard of
supervision of a child. This would be contrary to the notion of preserving the
family, and it is unlikely to have the results of minimizing juvenile delinquency
with firearms. States should allow a higher recovery in tort law and allow the
family members of the victim(s) of the juvenile's crime to pursue punitive
damages against the parents who neglected their duty to supervise the delinquent
child. Guilty verdicts in wrongful death actions might provide an excellent
incentive for parents to supervise their child more closely. States should also
follow the trend to reduce the age that minors are tried as adults. When a minor
commits a murder the child should be tried and sentenced as an adult for the
crime.
Although these juvenile accessibility to weapons statutes may be contrary to
prevailing criminal concepts the trend for lawmakers to pass these types of
statutes is growing. And the net result is that parents will continue to be put in an
ever-precarious situation of becoming criminals themselves for their negligent
supervision. It is also likely that states will increase the fines associated with these
statutes. This trend can be seen in the Senate Bill 1917, which would allow a
$10,000 fine against a parent for allowing a minor access to a firearm.181
Yet, it is unlikely that reducing a child's access to a firearm at home will
reduce the overall crime rate of juveniles and firearms. If a child wants to get a
gun, he/she is most likely going to find one whether it be inside or outside the
home. Perhaps no amount of reasonable parental control may prevent a
determined juvenile from accessing weapons. But parents should not disregard
181. See supra note 51.
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the warning signs of violence and should do whatever is possible to keep a firearm
out of the unsupervised hands of children. It was much easier when the only
weapon a child could use would be a sharp-tongued insult. Unfortunately times
have changed and with that our legislatures are moving to force parents to
supervise children. Perhaps there will be a time in the future when the only thing
parents have to worry about is whether their child's lunch is packed for the next
day. Until then, mom and dad beware because your community is watching!
Richard M. AuBuchon
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